Arctic Geopolitics: “The battle for the High North has begun” (trans.) (Labévière & Thual. 2008. 1)
The Arctic’s location between the continents of North America, Europe and Asia made it an arena for geopolitical aggressions throughout the Cold War before the High North slipped into the academic periphery (Østreng. 2013; Østerud & Hønneland. 2014). Climate change has, however, brought it back into the vanguard of International Relations (IR) (Østerud & Hønneland. 2014). The Arctic’s average temperature has risen by 2.3°C since the 1970s, corresponding with the consecutive reduction of summer sea ice extent each year (WWF. N.d. a; Arctic Program. N.d.). Once seen as an immobile ‘ice sea’ with few resources, the melting of the High Arctic has prompted a “scramble for the Poles” (Dodds & Nuttall. 2016. I; Dodds. 2018.109). Tensions have developed between Arctic and non-Arctic nations that seek to exploit the offshore hydrocarbon reserves and potential Arctic trades routes, despite the environmental zeitgeist of the past three decades (Østreng. 2013; WWF. N.d. b; The Economist. 2012; Pezard. 2018). This is especially prevalent for the Svalbard archipelago. Situated in the Barents Sea, only “800 miles from the North Pole” (Anderson. 2009. 122), the islands are recognised as part of the Kingdom of Norway under the Svalbard Treaty, yet the Russian government has continuously disputed its sovereignty (Østreng. 1977).
I will begin by looking at academic literature concerning sovereignty and the shifting roles of realism, liberalism, and political economy within the Arctic geopolitical praxis, before briefly overviewing the history and geopolitical significance of Svalbard. The main section then examines three geopolitical tactics that Norway and Russia have employed to reiterate their claims of sovereignty. Finally, the conclusion summarises the geopolitical influences of Svalbard and discusses areas that could add additional insights to this field that this paper was unable to explore to maintain a precise analysis.
High North, High Tension: Review of academic literature in relation to Arctic geopolitics
Liberalism and Realism
The Post-Cold War high geopolitical stability of the Arctic, which President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) designated as a “zone of peace”, embodies the success of institutional and international cooperation by Arctic and non-Arctic states (Heininen. 2018). Organisations, such as the Arctic Council, Arctic Economic Council and Arctic Five, have fostered agonism in place of the Cold War’s antagonism through laws, bilateral agreements, and shared scientific research (Heininen. 2018; Østerud & Hønneland. 2014; Springer. 2016). The ‘sphere of cooperation’, established within the previous decades, follows liberalist, or “institutionalist” (Østerud & Hønneland. 2014. 157) ideals; summarised by the Norwegian slogan “High North, Low Tension” (Østerud & Hønneland. 2014. 165). With this said, the circumpolar North appears to exhibit dual geopolitical qualities. Classical, or realist geopolitics is distinctly evident through the growing importance of ‘hard power’ (Heininen. 2018. 179).
Bell (2016) asserts that classical geopolitics is primarily focused on state sovereignty, military force, and the pursuit of national economic interests (p.2-3). The lack of nuclear disarmament and consistent military presence within areas of the Arctic illustrates this remaining security anxiety (Heininen. 2018). Climate change has transformed the High Arctic into a “resource storehouse” (Heininen. 2018. 179). Fish have migrated north in search of colder waters, there is improved accessibility to off-shore natural oil and gas deposits, and potential trade routes are becoming more feasible each year (Truc. 2013; Østreng. 2013; The Economist. 2012). Dodds & Nuttall (2016), through a realist geopolitical lens, compare the international ‘race’ to exploit and claim these new resources to the “scramble for Africa” (p.vii), hinting that states could employ violent or unlawful tactics to gain control (p.31). However, Østerud and Hønneland (2014) contests Dodds & Nuttall’s premise, arguing that Arctic nations favour the stability that institutionalism has cultivated and are weary of the consequences a break of the ‘Arctic consensus’ would generate (p.171-172; Heininen. 2018).
Threats to State Sovereignty
Practical sovereignty, as outlined by Gregory et al. (2009), is reliant on the interrelated processes of internal sovereignty (whereby a state’s authority over its territory is based on legal and public consensus in relation to the effectiveness of the regime) and the “mutual recognition from other states” [p. 706], known as external sovereignty. Under the Post-World War Two liberalist zeitgeist, this system of sovereignty has thrived. However, Græger (2019) highlights that the re-emergence of realist geopolitics (displayed through President Trump’s protectionist foreign policies, ‘Brexit’ and the growth of right-wing politics across Europe) will destabilise existing political systems and transboundary cooperation (p.84-85). Græger argues that the ‘middle powers’ of the Arctic are the most at risk from this shift. Middle powers are states that possess modest power but use it to great effect, in the forms of humanitarian and peace work, known as ‘soft power’ (p.86). To maintain their security, and therefore sovereignty, middle powers generally employ the ‘sheltering’ tactic of seeking support from ‘great powers’ (p.91). The rise of classical geopolitics, or illiberalism, will reduce international cooperation and thus, remove middle powers’ security (p.101).
Additionally, Lieven (2020) asserts that climate change is the gravest threat to the inter-state system of sovereignty (p.7). Lieven, influenced by the securitisation theory and Richard Ullman’s (1995) realist geopolitic work, proposes that climate change is “a threat to national security” (p.9), as it will incur internal contestation of state legitimacy (p.16). Lieven elaborates by arguing that mass migration of climate refugees will “undermine political unity” (p.9) and internal dissent will be kindled by the state’s failure to respond efficiently to global warming (p.8 -13). When the geopolitical ramifications of climate change are combined with the decline of liberalism, the ‘sphere of cooperation’ appears fragile, despite insistence that its foundations are solid and resilient (Heininen. 2018).
A brief history of Svalbard and Norwegian/Russian geopolitical interactions
During the Paris Peace Conference following World War One, Norway was given “full and absolute sovereignty” (Svalbard Treaty. 1920) of the Svalbard archipelago, formally known as Spitzbergen, settling the long-standing legal debate over the islands’ sovereignty. However, the Soviet Union contested this decision as it viewed the archipelago, along with the rest of the Arctic, as an integral part of Russia (Emmerson. 2011). However, to cling to what influence it held in Svalbard, Russia signed the treaty in 1935 (Emmerson. 2011). In response to this slight, Russia “enthusiastically” (Emmerson. 2011. 33) adopted an Arctic geopolitical approach which stemmed from the Icelandic-Canadian-American explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson (1870-1962). Stefansson advocated classical geopolitics. He rejected the idea that international economic policies and cooperation in the Arctic would benefit Europe, instead arguing that the pursuit of national economic interests should be second only to Arctic state security (Emmerson. 2011). Stefansson’s realist geopolitics counters the liberalist arguments of Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), who has influenced Norwegian policies in the High North since its independence in 1905 (Emmerson. 2011). Nansen’s ideals are summarised by the word ‘Fram’ (the Norwegian for “forwards”), referencing his belief that Norway’s future lay in institutionalism and Northern resources (Emmerson. 2011). While the geopolitical tactics that Norway and Russia employ towards Svalbard shift and mutate over time, their overall Arctic geopolitical policies will ultimately reflect these core beliefs.
Discussion
Section One. Interpretations of the Svalbard Treaty and UNCLOS
The Svalbard Treaty “bears all the hallmarks of classical liberalism” (Østreng. 1977. 79), as Articles Two and Three establish the equal access to the archipelago’s resources for all signatory countries of the Treaty of Paris (Truc. 2013). It stated that they may “exercice [sic] and practice… enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters and no monopoly shall be established” (Svalbard Treaty. 1920). Norway governed Svalbard, with a laissez-faire approach, further entrenching liberalist geopolitics in the region in the hopes of fostering Arctic cooperation (Østreng. 1977). In the late 1950s, when the Cold War began to intensify, Norway entered the ‘action period’ of its relationship with Svalbard. It was characterised by stricter regulations in regard to mining and fishing, and the improvement of transport and communication infrastructure to strengthen Oslo’s ability to exercise jurisdiction (Østreng. 1977). This shift was prompted by Russia’s growing aggression and restlessness within the Arctic. Despite being Norway’s primary competitor for Svalbard, the Soviet Union was excluded from the Spitzbergen Conference and so viewed Norwegian sovereignty as merely a “coincidence” (Østreng. 1977. 83). In the 1970s, Norway and Russia reached an unofficial accord, with Russia ceasing to push Svalbard economic restrictions and Norway easing the stringent measures. This harmony was brokered by equal anxiety that the opposing state would enlist Article Two of the treaty to its fullest capacity, which Emmerson (2011) depicts this scenario as a “Catch-22” (p.109). The Storting (Norwegian Parliament), which must ensure equal access to resources for all signatory nations, has stated that it would “ban all [commercial activity] up here, including Norwegian ones. That’s equal!” (p.109). The Kremlin also has the right to demand a self-government for its citizens in Svalbard, which would force Norway to not only comply but also establish self-governments for all nationalities present in Svalbard, essentially negating Norwegian sovereignty (Østreng. 1977). As mentioned previously, climate change has reinvigorated international interest in the Arctic. The appeal of profit from the potential resources in Svalbard’s surrounding territory has led to this uneasy agreement being revised, with both Russia and Norway following Stefansson’s geopolitical approach of national self-interest, much to the dismay of the international community (Truc. 2013).
The recent tensions are primarily linked with the Russian belief that Norway’s refusal to allow international access to the majority of sovereign waters of the archipelago, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), breaks the Svalbard Treaty. However, Oslo argues that it is merely following a literal interpretation of the treaty (Adomaitis. 2020; Truc. 2013; Østreng. 1977). In 2008, Arctic nations mutually agreed that the UNCLOS would apply to Arctic waters, settling the debate of how sovereignty should apply to ‘ice spaces’ (the temporary nature of ice lead to confusion of whether it should be considered as land or water) (Østerud & Hønneland. 2014; Fløistad et al. 2013). Russia has used this agreement to scrutinise the management of Svalbard’s territorial waters. The Kremlin asserts that if Norway accepts the jurisdiction of UNCLOS in the Arctic, then it should equally accept that the international community should have access to resources within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding Svalbard since the EEZ is part of the UNCLOS (Truc. 2013; Adomaitis. 2020; Østreng. 1977). Norway justifies its actions by stating that the UNCLOS did not exist when the Svalbard Treaty was written, thus the 12-mile zone of sovereign waters of the archipelago should be sufficient for the commercial activity of signatory countries (Østreng. 1977). In this interaction, Norway and Russia employ geopolitical methods that oppose their primary approaches, flipping their relationship as Norway displays the realist pursuit of self-interest while Russia cooperates with Arctic states in opposition.
Section Two. Arousing Envy: Svalbard’s duality as a “storehouse of resources” and an “environmental linchpin” (AHDR. 2004)
Midgley (2012) proposes that Svalbard’s geopolitics is dominated by the inter-connecting objectives of economic activity and sovereignty, known as geopolitical economy (GPE), rather than liberalism or realism (p.60). Drawing from David Harvey’s (2003) concepts of “territorial and capitalist logics of power” (p.60), Midgley contends that the consistent economic presence of Norway and Russia in Svalbard is a reference to the “use it or lose it” (Emmerson. 2011. 95) principle, that seeks to maintain political influence over the region, and hence sovereign claims (p.65). As mentioned previously, climate change has exposed alluring economic resources in the Arctic (such as 22% of the world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves and potentially affluent trade routes, shown in Figure 6) (Østreng. 2013). It is unclear whether Norway and Russia’s reinvigorated economic interest comes from Stefansson’s realist influence or is further evidence of GPE.
What is certain, however, is the consequences of this shift: the extraction of resources will exasperate global warming causing a rapid deterioration of the Arctic, that will take Norwegian and Russian security and sovereignty with it (Lieven. 2020). This continued exploitation of nature reflects humanity’s ouroboros tendencies Jules Verne encapsulates in his 1889 novel The Purchase of the North Pole which prophetically details how the greed for the Arctic’s hidden resources can result in catastrophic damage to the rest of the world (Dodds & Nuttall. 2016). The pursuit of these resources may prove futile economically, as Humpert (2013) refutes the suggestion that the Northeast passage (NEP) will become the “new Silk Road” (p.4). He remarks that while the NEP would reduce the travelling distance between Asia and Europe, it would not be more cost-efficient as infrastructure would need to be built across the Russian coastline to make the shipping industry feasible (p.15). Humpert continues, stating that China would not endorse the scheme as it would not want to aid in strengthening Russia’s realist sphere of influence over the Arctic, leaving Russia without financial backing (p.12; VisualPolitik. 2017). This sentiment is supported by the failure of Svalbardian coalmines to produce a profit, as it took over 80 years for the Norwegian coalmine, Store Norske, to generate a profit (Midgley. 2012). Østerud & Hønneland (2014) concisely depict the geopolitical situation in the phrase, “the North Pole, certainly is a symbolic prize worth a flag contest but it is not a profitable goal” (p.176).
Figure 5. Time-lapse of glacial retreat in Templfjorden, Svalbard from March to October 2020. Source: Made by the author through Sentinel-Hub EO-Browser.
In addition to Norway’s resource extraction threatening its sovereignty of Svalbard through the effects of climate change, it could also threaten it legally, since the Svalbard Treaty places the responsibility to protect and conserve the archipelago’s natural environment on the Storting (Avango & Roberts. 2017). Norway has largely neglected this duty in favour of economic benefits. There is a clear core-periphery system concerning environmentalism in Norway. In Oslo, at the centre of the state, great significance is placed on the mitigation of global warming, yet at the periphery of the state, in Svalbard, this zeitgeist is largely waylaid (Gregory et al. 2009; Oslo Kommune. N.d.). To reduce the impact of climate change on state security and sovereignty, prefigurative geopolitics (the establishment of policies that reflect “the future society being sought” [Springer. 2016. 7, 18-19] with a focus on the environment). Bell (2016) asserts that realism is required for prefigurative geopolitics to be successful (p.5-6). However, the cooperation encouraged by the Arctic Council implies favourable political conditions for prefigurative geopolitics to be based on transborder cooperation (Heininen. 2018).
Section Three. Sheltering and Illiberalism
In the face of Russian aggression during the Cold War, Norway frequently sought ‘shelter’ and security from the US and NATO (Græger. 2019). However, Græger (2019) states that these tactics may not be feasible in the near future due to the US’s recent protectionist foreign policies and the spread of illiberalism (p.94). This has prompted Norway, as a middle power, to seek shelter from Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Council and Arctic Five. Yet, Russian involvement in these same organisations pose a threat to Norway, since Russia, as a ‘great power’, could potentially pressurize other ‘middle power’ Arctic states into contesting the Storting’s sovereignty of Svalbard. Considering this threat to security, Norway has accumulated power within these liberalist organisations with the intent to minimise Russian superiority in these councils, as well as to leverage other middle powers against Russian interests (Græger. 2019). An example of this successful strategy is how, in 2011, the Arctic Council agreed to locate the Secretariat (which provides the administration and communication services for the Arctic Council) permanently in Tromsø, Norway, despite Russian disapproval (Arctic Council Secretariat. 2021; Græger. 2019).
Conclusion
Svalbard’s tabula rasa quality allowed classical and institutional geopolitics to transform the islands into a political landscape dictated by economic aspirations, essentially stripping it of its “wild state” (Thoreau. 2018) that evoked the Arctic sublime (Dodds. 2018). It is evident that, in relation to Svalbard, political economy plays a significant geopolitical role, but liberalism and realism, influenced by works of Nansen and Stefansson, respectively, still hold weight in Norwegian and Russian policies. Additionally, future studies of Svalbard’s contested sovereignty should incorporate John Agnew’s (2008) understanding of nationalism. It could help frame a discussion on Norway and Russia’s creation of museums to create a nationalist narrative in the region with the intention of solidifying their claims (Roberts. 2016). Moreover, it is important to note that, while Norway and Russia are currently the only signatory countries to fully take advantage of the treaty, other Arctic nations (such as Denmark, Iceland, and the US), alongside non-Arctic states (in particular, the UK and China) have demonstrated a growing interest, which could be analysed in further studies to gain a more holistic view of Svalbard’s shifting geopolitics (Emmerson. 2011; Dodds & Ingimundarson. 2012; Pedersen. 2011; Pezard. 2018; Ingimundarson. 2018). Ultimately, the current exploitation of Svalbard’s resources will only succeed in bringing life to Verne’s (1889) prophetic novel and further erode the sovereignty and security of nation-states (Dodds & Nuttall. 2016.; Bell. 2016). The adoption of prefigurative geopolitics (potentially from a realist stance) could engender a framework to combat the “wicked problem” (Heininen. 2018. 171) of climate change, that would see Svalbard as a “barometer” or “lens through which to view the world” (Heininen. 2018. 172; Emmerson. 2011. 8; Springer. 2016).
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