The former British colony of Sierra Leone appeared to have a stable political system around the time of their independence in 1961 (Clapham, 2003). The formal collapse of the state occurred in 1991 but Sierra Leone was not an obvious contender for such a collapse. Nevertheless, the political economy suffered, and the war persisted. From the 1950s to the 1970s resource wealth dominated the ideological discussion of development scholars and Marxist and non-Marxist critics (Ross, 1999). Resource conflicts have been infamous in West Africa for years, particularly in the 1990s, due to its obstruction of development (Blench and Dendo, 2004). With this in mind, how did the wider geopolitical scene of West Africa affect the resource war in Sierra Leone? How has the conflict diamond impacted the prospects of a functioning democracy? And is ‘Liberal Peace’ the answer for Sierra Leone?
This article will concentrate on the geopolitics of Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone and each section of the main body addresses one of the thesis questions. The literature review looks at the analytical and conceptual framework of this article and the preceding literature which addresses this topic. The main body introduces the political scene in West Africa and the global flow of diamonds, followed by the political setting which presented itself because of the resource war in Sierra Leone. And the final component will focus on the prospects for peace and political stability in Sierra Leone. A brief conclusion will reiterate the findings of this article and establish whether the curse of diamonds in Sierra Leone will impact the prospects of a stable and functioning democracy in the future.
Literature Review
Blood diamonds first attracted attention in the media as they were portrayed as the main motive behind greed-driven wars of infamous warlords (Le Billon, 2008). Contrary to popular belief, diamonds became a solution for the chronic poverty that infected much of Africa, hence the adoption of the phrase ‘’luck be stronger than death.’’ Le Billon would argue that resource wars often have less to do with power driven individuals and more to do with the spatial context of these resources. This is an all-encompassing piece of literature which offers a varying perception of resource conflicts where popular cultural and political discourses in that region may shape powerful geopolitical imaginations and scenarios. Geopolitical discourses are often perceived as truthful and authoritative which results in the reproduction of ‘knowledge hegemony’ and subsequent political action (Nwankwo, 2019). Exposing this shows the everyday discourses which produce specific spatial imaginations and contexts which justify violence (Nwankwo, 2019). The demands for the wealth of Sierra Leone have been encompassed in a history of repression and suffering (Le Billon, 2001). Le Billon describes the typical situation in many underdeveloped countries which are rich in natural resources. The profits produced by resource industries are the means through which poor economic growth and limited social mobility aside from politics are born (Le Billon, 2001). Although Le Billon specified Angola, these industries exercised free reign over the sector of the economy in Sierra Leone also causing the political economy to degenerate into violent conflicts (Le Billon, 2001).
The concept of vulnerability is not restricted to conflict studies but is used in many texts examining resource wars. Le Billon would argue that the idea is intrinsically linked to resource dependence because it represents and shapes the conditions which lead to increased vulnerability to violent conflicts (Le Billon, 2008). In accordance with the geopolitical economic literature, vulnerability is embodied in low income, declining economic growth rate, relatively ‘weak’ state coercive capacity and is found in the transitional stage of a political regime (Besancon, 2005). Furthermore, the concept of vulnerability could be extended to the miners who have fallen victim to the capitalist venture of diamond mining which became a dependency for the locals (Walsh, 2004). From a Marxist perspective, diamonds possess an ‘exchange value’ but lack a use value for these workers (D’Angelo, 2014).
According to the existing literature there are three dominant ways of understanding the conflict over resource abundance. ‘Resource curse’ was first used by Auty to explain why resource rich countries could not use their energy abundance to advance their economy. This idea argues that resource dependency causes certain countries to underperform economically, have less political stability, and achieve relatively low scores on social indicators, in comparison with countries of a similar income level (Auty, 2001). This dependency shapes the country’s political economy and means of governance (Auty, 2001). The ‘Dutch Disease’ model analysed the effect of ‘resource curse’ and established the correlation between abundance of natural resources and economic growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995). The risk of ‘resource conflicts’ emerges in a conceptual capacity where the resource sector encourages the process of allocation which in turn will make violent resistance more likely (Le Billion, 2008). Finally, Bannon and Collier describe ‘conflict resources’ as an opportunity for rebels. A key component of this concept, as identified by their work, is ‘interconnection’ (Bannon and Collier, 2003). This interconnection between belligerents and resource revenues causes the conflict to sustain through time (Bannon & Collier, 2003). In his article, Michael Ross claims that such an abundance of natural resources does hurt democracy and extended political instability (Ross, 2015). In his words, there are three mechanisms which indefinitely support the link between oil and authoritarianism. These being a rentier effect, a repression effect, and a modernization effect (Ross, 2015). In line with this thinking, Watts’ writing on oil in Nigeria claims that the resource has impeded prospects for democracy for decades despite efforts of ‘resource control and ‘self-determination’ (Watts, M. 2004). Both articles effectively explain the ‘resource curse’ in various instances and Watts further emphasizes ‘petro-capitalism’ in his analysis of Nigeria, which experienced a contradiction between state fragmentation and oil-based state centralization (Watts, 2004). This literature creates a solid foundation for further study of the case of Sierra Leone. This conceptual framework is used in this essay with the objective of better understanding the causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and then evaluate the obstacles still faced by the country.
i) The Political Scene in West Africa and the Global Flow of Diamonds
From a West African viewpoint, one of the main issues of contention involves the Liberian government. Sierra Leone and Liberia have been compared on many occasions because an extreme version of neo-patrimonial politics can be found in these conflicts. This is the necessity of self-securitization through self-categorisation into ‘self’ and ‘other’ (Boas, 2001). Despite the Security Council sanctions on Liberia, the Taylor government has continued to engage in ‘illicit exchanges,’ made easier by their close proximity to Sierra Leone (see Figure 1). Diamond and timber sales have long been financing many illegal activities, including Charles Taylor’s efforts of sabotage in nearby countries (Le Billon, 2001).
The concept of ‘resource curse’ is supported by the consistent evidence of lagging growth rates in resource rich Africa and specifically places like Liberia and Sierra Leone. In direct contrast to this stagnation, the growth of the resource-poor East Asia from the 1960s supplements this notion (Ross, 1999). In many countries of West Africa, wetland areas have been prone to resurging resource conflicts between farmers and pastoralists (Blench and Dendo, 2004). This regional politics was highly influential in the insurgencies in Sierra Leone.
The global diamond industry had been riddled with corruption since day one. Even Western governments cannot claim to be the embodiment of fair governance. Some well-established Canadian mining firms have shown more progressive work practices. However, many junior firms have been exposed by UN fact-finding and other NGOSs reports for suspicious mining interests in Sierra Leone and Angola during their civil wars (Grant and Taylor, 2004). The chief prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone reminds the international community of the relationship between the corrupt Al Qaeda and diamonds in Sierra Leone. This becomes an issue among the international political community when there is evidence of purchase and laundering of Sierra Leonean diamonds by Al Qaeda (Grant and Taylor, 2004). This is because an international watchful eye in the form of global governance is required on many levels to suppress such harmful activity.
The paradox of enormous resource wealth and terrible civil unrest in not limited to the case of Sierra Leone as the monopoly company, De Beers mine approximately 50% of global diamond production where similar circumstances have unfolded (Chang & Heron, 2002). De Beers dominate the diamond market by several means including the purchasing and hoarding of diamonds with the intent to limit the supply within the market and manipulate prices (Spar, 2006). The company have much to lose if these diamonds find themselves in corrupt hands (Bone, 2004). The main reason that De Beers can maintain this cartel is down to the support from governments who can enforce agreement while they provide the government with centrally collected tax revenues (Chang and Heron, 2002). As late as the mid-1990s 10 to 15% of the world’s supply of diamonds was extracted from war zones like Sierra Leone and Angola, in Africa (Chang and Heron, 2002). Warlords often controlled the sale of diamonds on the world market, primarily because they are easily concealed and a compact currency form which can be transported and sold on very easily (Spar, 2006). This did not suit De Beers who felt that such acts would threaten their dominant position in the global market and hurt the industry’s image. Therefore, with a socially conscious front, the company put forward proposals for tougher regulations against the sale of these ‘conflict diamonds.’
ii) The Political Economy of Sierra Leone and the ‘Conflict Diamond’
As previously mentioned, Sierra Leone was not an obvious case for political instability. There was no ethnic divide which would have caused such a civil conflict nor were there many inherent problems in the state’s governance which is typical of large territories with poor communications such as Angola (Clapham, 2003). In addition, the political leaders of Sierra Leone were not significantly more war-hungry and evil than others connected with worse political failures in Africa. Eventually the country saw the crumbling of the political authority and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia’s support for the Revolutionary United Front invasion from Liberia. This supports the theory of a ‘conflict diamond.’ The RUF, as well as the Sierra Leonean government and other actors, were dependent on ‘conflict diamonds’ for a large portion of their revenue (Clapham, 2003). This was the turn of events which caused a subjectively irreversible political downfall. The political economy of the civil war and subsequent cause for intervention resulted in an emergency which involved the whole country (Zach-Williams, 1999).
Conflict diamonds rapidly became an international issue. In the space of roughly two years the industry went from complete denial of the existence of a ‘conflict diamond’ to the setting up of a committee in the Kimberley Process (2003) to regulate the diamond trade (Grant and Taylor, 2004). De Beers capitalised on the Kimberley Process. There was involvement from Commonwealth countries with an interesting variety of actors engaged in the process who transcended the traditional state -to-state ‘diplomatic channels’ which are usually taken for granted in international politics (Grant and Taylor, 2004).
The conflict over diamonds in Sierra Leone represents a typical political ecology linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources (Auty, 2001). Diamonds were a means of funding armed conflict in the country. All parties used these diamonds to fuel their war efforts from the RUF to the government-allied Civil Defence Forces (Richards, 2003). Sierra Leone fell victim to capitalism in its most pervasive form. Diamond mining and transactions in the country have long been riddled with a ‘shroud of mystery’ which has hindered prospects for a functioning democracy and for justice (Richards, 2003). One major issue throughout this struggle was the smuggling. This ensured taxes on diamonds were low and to date this is still a problem. Unfortunately, politicians and public officials with huge responsibilities were intrinsically involved in this activity, creating a ‘parasitic elite’ (Richards, 2003). The elite and their foreign business partners were served by the industry. Included in this was the Prime Minister Siaka Stevens who made the large Lebanese merchant community in Sierra Leone partners when it came to criminalizing the country’s diamond industry (Richards, 2003).
iii) Obstructions to Peace and Political Stability in Sierra Leone
For over a decade, Sierra Leone was consumed by a conflict typical in a post-Cold War world and one which is closely linked to the country’s natural resources (Silberfein, 2004). Warlord President of Liberia, Charles Taylor continued his destabilizing policy choices in the region, and so prospects for peace in Sierra Leone were set to remain shaky even after the war ‘ended’ (Hirsch, 2001). The capitalist authoritarian Taylor regime contributed to the issues in Sierra Leone as a constant interest of theirs was to ensure that the sale of diamonds continued to filter through to pay for his presidential security (Clapham, 2003). As this regime eventually ran its course, prospects for political stability began to look up. However, perhaps the mistakes of the past are not far enough away for the government to ignore. Following the second decade of operation financial problems crept up for the original district councils as their grants began to dwindle (Fanthrope, 2006). Political infighting and corruption scandals began to overshadow any progress. The training of councillors and members of the World Diamond Council continued into 2005. However, sceptics argued that decentralization would simply become a new platform for the old politics to re-enter the scene (Fanthrope, 2006). The solution to conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone was a liberal peace strategy but was this simply reshuffling an old deck of cards? (Jackson, 2007).
Unfortunately, the run up to the 2012 presidential election saw clashes between the two leading parties and some serious acts of violence which resulted in the police enforced ban on political rallies (Van der Veen and Datzberger, 2020). The strong undercurrent throughout these events was of a deep politically divisive nature. Economic desperation and frustration are the realities which prevent peace because often material rewards and promises of patronage have been sufficient incentive for many people participate in violent outbursts (Van der Veen and Datzberger, 2020). These are the underlying realities which liberal peace strategies must understand in order to achieve peace. Fortunately, the current President, Julius Maada Bio denounced the corrupt activities of the former President and used his power to return the country to a democratically elected government. Bio recognised the strategic importance of the diamond industry to the country but set objectives to increase their value and to use the profits from diamonds to reinvest in human capital development.
The diamond industry dominated every aspect of the workers’ lives, infecting their economy and physical landscape and beyond this, women were subjected to further social restraints which restricted them to the private and belittling sphere of their home (Auty, 2001). But what happens when diamonds go bust? (Pijpers, 2010). Unfortunately, the political economy of Sierra Leone is dependent on diamonds and to guarantee any political stability President Bio has the task of maintaining political solidity and restructuring the economy to serve the population of Sierra Leone rather than burden them, for once.
Conclusion
The geopolitics of West Africa affected almost every aspect of the resource war in Sierra Leone and because of this, the country has been left behind in many ways. Large multi-national corporations are pleased when their supply needs are sustained and when the competition is virtually nonexistent, but there is a great deal of hurt left in Sierra Leone. While there is healing in terms of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDF) programs, many women do not feel part of a ‘post’-conflict society, particularly those who were discouraged from involving themselves in reintegration practices (MacKenzie, 2009). Liberal peace is Sierra Leone’s best shot at ensuring political stability in a country where turbulence has dominated the scene since 1991.
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